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The purpose of Being and Doing: An Interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
Theta is to explain the meaning and philosophical significance of Aristotle’s claim that 
energeia has priority in being over capacity (dynamis). To this end, Beere argues that 
Aristotle had one single consistent concept in mind, although modern translations render 
‘energeia’ in some contexts as ‘activity’ (e.g. pleasure is unimpeded activity, i.e. 
energeia) and in some other different contexts as ‘actuality’ (the infinite is not in 
actuality, i.e. energeia), as if the term stood for two different excluding concepts. 
The book is structured as a philosophical study and commentary of book Theta of 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics. It is a commentary insofar as it explains and discusses one by 
one each chapter of Metaphysics Theta. It is a philosophical study insofar as it analyzes 
with a critical and historically charitable eye each concept and argument put forward by 
Aristotle. However, Beere does not hesitate to make philological points of philosophical 
relevance and to pursue Metaphysical issues beyond Metaphysics Theta and the 
Metaphysics into other areas of the Aristotelian corpus.  
The book is divided into four parts and fourteen chapters devoted to the 
relationship between capacities and change (parts I and II/Metaphysics Theta 1 to 5), the 
concepts of being-in-capacity and being-in-energeia (part III/Metaphysics Theta 6 and 7), 
the priority of energeia over capacity, and the impact Aristotle’s notion of energeia has 
on his conception of the good and bad (part IV/Metaphysics Theta 7 to 9). 
In part I, The Significance of Metaphysics Theta, Beere reconstructs the historical 
background to Metaphysics Theta. He successfully shows that Plato’s Battle of Gods and 
Giants in the Sophist is the historical antecedent to Aristotle’s discussion on energeia. 
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According to Beere, one of the merits of Metaphysics Theta lies in superseding Plato by 
giving causal powers a prominent role in Metaphysics and Philosophy.  
Part II, Powers for action and Passion, studies the Greek term ‘power’ (dynamis), 
in order to elucidate its philosophical sense in Aristotle. Beere provides seven relevant 
features a power has according to Aristotle:  
(i) A power is inextricably connected to the notion of change (kinêsis) and 
consists in a capacity to change. (ii) Contrary to our modern intuitions, a power is a 
quality and is not, strictly speaking, a trigger of change, but a capacity to bring about a 
change in another thing or oneself as another thing.  
(iii) It may appear that powers come in correlative pairs, e.g. the doctor’s power 
to heal and the patient’s power to be healed. However, the change a passive power is the 
causal basis of, is the very same change the correlative active power is the causal basis 
for.   
(iv) Powers are for the sake of an end. Rational powers, in particular, are powers 
for either of two possible opposite results, and their agents do not posses per se the 
property they produce, though they come to have that property by means of 
understanding.  
(v) A power, insofar it is an intrinsic property and a quality, is to be distinguished 
from both the state of affairs that occurs when it operates and the circumstances that 
determine its possibility of operating. Beere explains that this distinction allows Aristotle 
to solve the paradox imposed by the Megaric argument, which claims that: x cannot φ 
when it is not φ-ing because it lacks then the power to φ; x can φ only when x is 
engaging in φ-ing, that is to say, when all the necessary conditions for φ-ing are met and 
the process of φ-ing is going on.  
The distinction between power, state of affairs, and circumstances prompts, in 
turn, two further distinctions: First, (vi) a distinction between  (a) ‘being able’ and (b) 
‘possibility’. (a) ‘x being able to φ’ means that if the energeia for which x is said to have 
the capacity for belongs to it, nothing impossible (i.e. incompatible with necessary truths) 
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will follow. In contrast, ‘x being possible to φ’ simply means that x need not be realized. 
Beere argues that given this distinction and given that Aristotle doesn’t take ‘necessarily’ 
and ‘not possible’ to be equivalent, he can consistently accept an inference from ‘this is 
always so’ to ‘that is necessary so’, but not an inference from ‘this is not ever so’ to  ‘this 
is necessarily not so’.  
The second distinction prompted by the distinction between power, state of 
affairs, and circumstances is (vii) a distinction between (a) innate non-rational powers 
and (b) non-innate rational powers such that: (a) an innate non-rational power to φ does 
not need to be acquired by being active in φ-ing in advance. Since an innate power is a 
power to bring about one result, it is exercised when what can act and what can be acted 
on meet in the appropriate way, and these condition is sufficient for the innate power to 
act. (b) A non-innate rational power to φ, on the contrary, is acquired by being actively 
involved in φ-ing in advance and involves habit, or rationality, or learning because it is a 
power of opposite results. In this case, the power itself does not determine which of the 
two opposite outcomes will result. It is a principle of motion endowed with knowledge 
and activated by desire that determines which of the two opposite outcomes will result. A 
feature common to both innate non-rational powers and non-innate rational powers is that 
none of them is a cause on its own account. Powers are simply involved in causation and 
need external circumstances in order to be exercised.  
 Part III, Being-in-energeia and Being-in-capacity, elucidates the complementary 
concepts of energeia and capacity. Beere points out that ‘energeia’ is not registered 
before Aristotle and is a technical term etymologically related to the Greek adjective 
energos (at work), which is derivative from ergon (work). Similarly, the concept 
energeia itself had no antecedent before Aristotle.  What is more, energeia has no 
modern equivalent concept or composite of modern concepts. Beere suggests to stick to 
the etymology of the term and understand the concept as ‘do something’, i.e. as the 
exercise of a capacity to do something, more specifically, as the doing itself involved in 
the exercise of a capacity.  
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A further relevant feature of the term ‘energeia’ is that it has two syntactic 
constructions: (a) It is either constructed with ‘to be’, in which case it is usually taken to 
mean actuality and to contrast with potentiality, or (b) it is used as a noun that means 
activity (something complete at any instant it occurs) in contrast to change (something 
incomplete at any instant it occurs). Additionally, energeia is to be distinguished not only 
from change, but also from actuality. Beere argues that in Aristotle’s view change can 
neither be an energeia nor an actuality. Although energeia for Aristotle involves doing 
something and fulfilling a function (e.g. building a house), it does not necessarily involve 
change, for in some cases the fulfilling of a function is not an action (e.g. using 
knowledge to understand, i.e. contemplation). Nor can being in energeia for Aristotle be 
being in actuality, because things are in some cases actually active, while in some other 
cases they are potentially active or actually inactive. Consequently, energeia is closer to 
the notion of activity than to the modal notion of actuality.  
Beere also thinks that it is misleading to associate the correlates ‘being-in-
capacity and being-in-energeia’ to the correlates ‘possibility and actuality’. The reason 
for that is that Aristotle had not in view propositions and truth bearers of (actual or 
possible) states of affairs, which is what possibility and actuality suggest. Being-in-
capacity for Aristotle is rather a notion used to explain changes, and energeia is the 
complement of being-in-capacity in the sense that for an x to be in capacity F, is to 
specify a certain way of being F, such that x has the relevant capacities for being F, and 
those capacities are not being exercised.  
A further reason why Beere thinks it is misleading to associate Aristotle’s notion 
of energeia with actuality is that actuality nowadays plays a role in discussions of 
modality. ‘Actuality’ means in current English ‘what is the case’, and is contrasted with 
what is not the case but is possible. For Aristotle, however, energeia does not contrast 
with ‘not actuality being F’, i.e. ‘not in fact being F’, but with dynamis, which in the 
corpus aristotelicum is not a word for possibility. Beere concludes that ‘actuality’ is a 
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terribly misleading translation of ‘energeia’, but accepts it as the best available English 
translation.  
At this point one may expect Beere to reconstruct Aristotle’s definition of 
energeia. Yet, he does not do that and even dissuades the reader from doing so. The fact 
is that Aristotle did not think such definition could be provided in view of the fact that 
there is not a single definite feature all cases of energeia have in common. What makes 
up the concept of energeia is rather a relationship of analogy to a paradigmatic case, 
which is the exercise of an active power, e.g. the art of house-building. In the particular 
case of the house-builder’s power to build a house, (a) being-in-capacity is merely to 
have the power to engage in the energeia that consists in building a house, while (b) 
being in energeia is to have and be exercising the capacity to build a house. The energeia 
is the exercise of the capacity of house-building, and in this case it happens to coincide 
with turning something into a house and to involve the change of some material and not a 
change in the agent. In contrast, in analogical cases such as walking, the end of the 
energeia (i.e. waking) is just the energeia itself (i.e. waking itself) so that the energeia is 
its own end and therefore does not involve a change. This kind of disanalogy makes 
impossible to provide a single definition of energeia. 
Part III closes with a clarification of what makes an x be said to be in capacity F. 
At first blush two answers are possible: either constituents make an x said to be-in-
capacity F, or it is processes that make an x said to be-in-capacity F. According to Beere, 
Aristotle favours processes. Beere points out that for Aristotle (i) all processes of 
generation derive from basic processes involving the basic elements earth, air, fire, and 
water, (ii) these basic elements are never said to be anything bodily in capacity, (iii) the 
notion of being in capacity only applies to things that change, and (iv) there are two 
fundamental and irreducible classes of beings in capacity: (a) Things that have an 
external principle of genesis (i.e. substances and changes produced by a craft) and (b) 
things that have an internal principle of genesis (i.e. natural changes). (a) In the case of 
things that have an external principle of genesis, an x is in capacity F, if and only if, if a 
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properly qualified artisan desires to make x F, then, if nothing external to x prevents, x 
becomes F. (b) In the case of things that have an internal principle of genesis, x is in 
capacity F through itself provided nothing external interferes, i.e. x is in capacity F if and 
only if x is such that if nothing interferes x will be F. For instance, a human being in 
capacity is the last stage in the generation of a human being after which the rest happens 
on its own. That is to say, a human being in capacity is the stage at which there is some 
material that lacks the human form but it is suitable for becoming a human being. In both 
cases, that of things that have an internal principle of genesis and that of things that have 
an external principle of genesis, an F in capacity is the starting point of the change that 
results in an F in energeia. 
Part IV finally explains what it means, according to Aristotle, for energeia to be 
prior and superior to capacity. Beere starts by explaining the relationships between 
matter, change, and being-in-capacity. For Aristotle the matter of a composite substance 
is not what the composite is, it is just its material aspect. That aspect can be said to be a 
qualitative property in so far as it is properly specified by and adjective. This is exactly 
what the adjective that-en (ekeininon)—which has the same suffix as the Greek adjective 
wooden (hylon)—expresses. The connection between being that-en and being-in-capacity 
is the following: if y is x-en, then not only is y made of x but x is in capacity y, and x’s 
being in capacity y simply means that x is not in energeia y. For x to be in capacity y is 
for x to be able itself to become y, not for something that may be produced out of x to be 
able to become y. So for x to be in capacity y, it must be already ready to become y and 
not be in need of further transformation. It follows from this that the notion of being in 
capacity is not transitive: From x’s being-in-capacity y and y’s being-in-capacity z does 
not follow that x is in capacity z.  
Energeia has priority over capacity in three different respects:  (1) account, (2) 
time, and (3) being. (1) x is prior to y in account if the account of x does not involve the 
account of y, but the account of y involves the account of x.  Priority in account obviously 
involves priority in knowledge. (2) Priority in time and genesis is not meant relative to 
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any point in time but to a process of genesis. Being F in energeia is temporally prior to 
being F in capacity not in the sense that each thing that is in capacity F was itself 
previously F in energeia, but in the sense that some case of being in energeia F precedes 
being in capacity F. This amounts to ontological dependence of capacity in energeia and 
ontological priority of energeia over capacity.  
The reason energeia precedes capacity is that energeia determines capacity even 
if in a process of change energeia comes in sequential order after capacity and even if 
stages that are prior in being occur later in the process of change. That is so because it is 
energeia that determines the previous stages of the process and the process itself. In this 
interpretation, it is impossible that there be something that is in capacity φ-ing without 
there being something that is engaged in φ-ing. Capacities are forward looking, they are 
directed to a subsequent activity and activities are not directed to capacities. For that 
reason what is φ-ing determines what is able to φ and not vice versa. It follows that all 
capacities are for the sake of their corresponding energeiai, energeiai are posterior in 
genesis to their capacities, and what is posterior in genesis must be prior in being.  
An interesting point Beere emphasizes is that the interaction of a capacity with its 
environment constitutes some resistant to its exercise. That makes the exercise of a 
capacity laborious and dooms the capacity to wear out. In Aristotle’s view, capacities 
necessarily wear out. However, Aristotle also thinks that it is impossible for eternal 
things to perish, for their perishing would contradict a necessary truth. Aristotle in fact 
thinks that whatever is responsible (aition) for there being eternal things cannot be 
contingent, it must be necessarily responsible for there being eternal things, and therefore 
eternal things must necessarily be eternal.  For this reason, eternal moving things never 
exercise a capacity to move (even if they are in capacity moving from A to B before 
doing so in energeia). And since eternal moving things do not have a capacity, they 
cannot wear out. Indeed, if per impossible there were a capacity that is necessarily 
exercised, it would be identical with its own energeia and there would not be a distinction 
between capacity and energeia.  
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The book finishes with an inquiry on the consequences Aristotle’s argument for 
the superiority of energeia has on his understanding of goodness and the bad itself. 
Aristotle does not think the bad itself is something over and above bad things, for at the 
level of principles (i.e. eternal things) there is nothing either bad, erring, or corrupted. For 
this reason, energeiai are good per se and the bad is not prior but posterior in nature to 
the capacity that produces it.   
One may here detect a possible contradiction in Aristotle’s theory. Aristotle had 
concluded (Theta 8) that energeia is prior in being to capacity, and (Theta 9) that there 
are bad things that have capacities that are for the sake of bad energeia, so that bad 
energeia is posterior in generation and prior in being. Yet, this appears to contradict his 
definition of badness, according to which the bad is posterior in being to capacity. The 
contradiction dissolves as soon as one qualifies the assumption that every capacity 
straightforwardly is for the sake of the corresponding energeia. Rational powers and 
excellent capacities are of opposites and for that reason they can be exercised as to bring 
about their proper end provided they are correctly exercised. Yet, when they are misused, 
they can be exercised so as to bring about another end. The proper end of medicine and 
its capacity, for instance, is being healthy. Nevertheless medicine can be used to make 
people sick. This use, however, does not qualify medicine as a bad thing because it is 
external factors (e.g. defectiveness of the capacity itself, or some other natures) that 
prevent medicine from achieving its end.  Nature itself, contrary to rational powers, 
simply cannot be misused so as to bring about a result contrary to its proper end. One 
may still argue against Aristotle that some capacities are for the sake of a bad end (e.g. 
counterfeit money, the iron maiden) and are therefore straightforwardly bad. One may 
even argue that vices are capacities. According to Beere, Aristotle can counter argue that 
in the case of bad things the capacity to do bad depends on the capacity to acquire a good 
capacity, and therefore badness is posterior in nature to a capacity that is for the sake of 
something good.  As for vices, Aristotle can claim that the capacity to develop into a 
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vicious or virtuous person is itself posterior to virtuous activity. Consequently, all kind of 
vicious activity is posterior to both virtuous activity and the capacity for virtuous activity. 
 
This book stands out for its philosophical engagement and historical awareness, 
and it goes without saying that it unquestionable supersedes the existing literature on the 
topic, e.g. Charlotte Witt’s Ways of Being: Potentiality and Actuality In Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), and complements Stephen Makin’s 
commentary Aristotle Metaphysics Book Theta (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 2006). 
It should also be remarked that Beere’s contribution is not limited to the interpretation of 
Metaphysics Theta. His analysis and conclusions have a bearing on the whole of the 
Metaphysics and many areas of the Aristotelian corpus where the notions of energeia, 
power, and being-in-capacity play a role. Beere’s elucidation of Aristotle’s theory of 
energeia in Metaphysics Theta invites us to rethink Aristotle’s Metaphysical notions of 
matter and form, as well as Aristotle’s theory of human action and responsibility, not to 
mention aspects of his Physics, Biology, and theory of elements. This book is not only a 
must for specialists in Ancient Philosophy, but for all those interested in the Metaphysics 
of Powers, an issue that has lately become dominant in the current Philosophical milieu 
and onto which Aristotle can shed a refreshing light. 
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